

令和元年度 東北大学大学院環境科学研究科

人文・社会科学系群博士課程後期3年

入学試験問題

専 門 科 目

(社会人特別選抜)

環境科学・政策学

注 意 事 項

1. 試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題の中を見てはいけません。
2. 問題の印刷不鮮明に気づいた場合は、手を挙げて監督者に知らせてください。
3. 問題冊子1部(2頁)、解答用紙(4枚)及び草案用紙(2枚)を配布します。
4. 各解答用紙の「受験番号」欄には、受験番号のみを記入し、氏名は記入しないでください。
5. 所要時間は、90分(13:00～14:30)です。
6. 問題用紙は、持ち帰らないでください。

以上

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問題 次の英文を読んで、(ア)～(エ)の問いに日本語で答えなさい。

A core theme running throughout this volume is that the structure of concepts is crucial. As the literature on scales, indicators, and the like illustrates, there are many ways to construct a quantitative measure. Apart from the few key articles by Collier and his colleagues there is little or no discussion on the different ways one can construct concepts.

I stress that most important concepts we use are multidimensional and multilevel in nature. For example, Sartori's (1970) article talks about high-, medium-, and low-level categories while Collier and Mahon (1993) use the terminology of primary and secondary categories. I prefer to use the framework of "three-level" concepts.

The most important level theoretically is usually the concept as used in theoretical propositions, such as "corporatism," "democracy," or "welfare state." This I refer to as the basic level. It is "basic" in the sense of Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues; it is cognitively central. It is the noun to which we attach adjectives (Collier and Levitsky 1997) such as parliamentary democracy or democratic corporatism. The basic level is what we use in theoretical propositions.

The next level down from the basic level is what I call the secondary level. For example, when we say that democracy consists of civil rights, competitive elections, and so forth, we are descending to the secondary level to give the constitutive dimensions of the basic level democracy concept. It is when we move down to the secondary level that the multidimensional character of concepts appears. The secondary-level dimensions form much of the ontological analysis of concepts. They also play a central role in causal mechanisms of various sorts.

The next level down I call the indicator/data level. Alternatively, it could be called the operationalization level. At this level we get specific enough that data can be gathered, which permits us to categorize—either dichotomously or on a more fine-grained scale—whether or not a specific phenomenon, individual, or event falls under the concept.

In summary, we can dissect and analyze concepts by (1) how many levels they have, (2) how many dimensions each level has, and (3) what is the substantive content of each of the dimensions at each level.

(中略)

The second aspect of concept structure that I explore is how components at one level are combined or structured to produce dimensions at the next higher level. The basic-level concept of democracy is constituted by multiple secondary-level dimensions: how are these dimensions "combined" to arrive at the basic-level concept?

Throughout this book I continually contrast two different structural principles for constructing multidimensional and multilevel concepts. The first goes back to Aristotle and builds concepts using the structure of necessary and sufficient conditions.^[A] In classic philosophical logic to define a concept is to give the conditions necessary and sufficient for something to fit into the category. Each of these necessary conditions is a secondary-level dimension: the structural glue that binds the secondary-level dimensions together to form the basic level is the mathematics of necessary and sufficient conditions.

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The necessary and sufficient condition view of concepts was so standard that Sartori (1970) just assumes it. However, developments in philosophy, logic, and cognitive psychology have shown that there are other ways to construct concepts. I shall focus on the “family resemblance” concept structure_[B] which is in many ways the polar opposite of the necessary and sufficient condition one. In their groundbreaking article Collier and Mahon (1993) introduced the idea of family resemblance concepts into the political science literature. The family resemblance structure can be seen as the opposite of the necessary and sufficient condition one because it contains no necessary conditions. All one needs is enough resemblance on secondary-level dimensions to be part of the family.

(中略)

Central to the Sartori and Collier literature on concepts is a concern with “conceptual stretching_[C].” Conceptual stretching occurs when concepts are loosened up so that they apply to additional cases. In the philosophical literature this is the contrast between extension and intension. The classic principle was that as we loosen the concept (i.e., decrease intension) we increase its extension (number of empirical cases). One aspect then to concept structure is its coverage or permissiveness. Chapter 3 treats Sartori and Collier’s concern about how the structure of the concept relates to its empirical coverage.

Sartori (1970) borrowed from philosophical logic the basic principle that as intension decreases extension increases: as concepts become more permissive by requiring fewer attributes, they cover more cases. What Sartori assumed without discussion was that concepts were constructed with necessary and sufficient conditions. However, what chapter 3 shows is that if one adopts the family resemblance framework then in fact increasing intension (adding more attributes) can increase extension. The key point is that concept structure has important downstream consequences on the empirical coverage of the concept._[D]

(Gary Goertz, *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton University Press, 2005より)

- (ア) 下線部[A]について、具体例を挙げながら、文意に即して説明しなさい。
- (イ) 下線部[B]について、具体例を挙げながら、文意に即して説明しなさい。
- (ウ) 下線部[C]について、具体例を挙げながら、文意に即して説明しなさい。
- (エ) 下線部[D]について、具体例を挙げながら、文意に即して説明しなさい。